Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law
Volume 12

Number 1

Article 10

3-31-2017

Forensic Analysis of Virtual Hard Drives
Patrick Tobin
University College Dublin, Ireland, pat.tobin@ucdconnect.ie

Nhien-An Le-Khac
School of Computer Science & Informatics, University College Dublin, Ireland, an.lekhac@ucd.ie

Tahar Kechadi
Centre for Cyber Crime Investigation, University College Dublin, Ireland, tahar.kechadi@ucd.ie

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl

Recommended Citation
Tobin, Patrick; Le-Khac, Nhien-An; and Kechadi, Tahar (2017) "Forensic Analysis of Virtual Hard Drives,"
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 12 : No. 1 , Article 10.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2017.1438
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol12/iss1/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics,
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

Forensic Analysis of Virtual Hard Drives

JDFSL V12N1

FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF VIRTUAL HARD
DRIVES
Patrick Tobin
Nhien-An Le-Khac
M-Tahar Kechadi
University College Dublin
Dublin, Ireland
pat.tobin@ucdconnect.ie, {an.lekhac, tahar.kechadi}@ucd.ie

ABSTRACT
The issue of the volatility of virtual machines is perhaps the most pressing concern in any digital
investigation. Current digital forensics tools do not fully address the complexities of data
recovery that are posed by virtual hard drives. It is necessary, for this reason, to explore ways to
capture evidence other than those using current digital forensic methods. This should be done in
the most efficient and secure manner, as quickly, and in a non-intrusive way as can be
achieved. All data in a virtual machine is disposed of when that virtual machine is destroyed, it
may not therefore be possible to extract and preserve evidence such as incriminating images prior
to destruction. Recovering that evidence, or finding some way of associating that evidence with
the virtual machine before its destruction, is therefore crucial. In this paper, we present a method
of extracting evidence from a virtual hard disk drive in a quick, secure and verifiable manner,
with a minimum impact on the drive thus preserving its integrity for further analysis.
Keywords: Virtual Machine, Digital Forensics, Virtual Machine Forensics, Virtual Hard Drive

INTRODUCTION
It is very rare to find a crime scene where a
digital device of some kind has not been
used. Whether it is a tablet computer, a
phone or perhaps portable digital storage
device like a USB key or external hard drive,
and whether they are Unix, Linux or Windows
based systems these are devices that can be
taken possession of for examination [1]. The
data they contain can be catalogued, classified,
extracted
and
subject
to
detailed
examination. They constitute a physical
connection between their user or owner, those
data they contain and how those data were
used in a crime. The real, physical nature of
these devices is invaluable to an investigator,
but is absent where a virtual machine (VM) is
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involved, yet the goal of an examiner remains
the same - to secure as much evidence as
possible [2].
How evidence is collected is important to
its integrity and the subsequent conduct of any
investigation. What happens to that evidence
after collection is crucial, how it is saved, how
it is handled and processed, and how it is
related to an offence or misconduct is vitally
important to an investigation. Traditional
digital forensics has developed, tried, and
tested methods of achieving these goals and
tools have been developed for these
purposes. Applying these to VM forensics may
involve developing, or enhancing these tools or
methods further, or designing new tools to take
account of the absence of physical hardware.
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A VM possesses all the characteristics of
true hardware [3] - the virtual hard drive
(vHDD) is formatted to the specifications of
the operating system being used, the virtual
RAM (vRAM) has all the expected attributes
that true RAM has, as do the other virtual
devices associated with a VM, e.g. NICs, USB
controllers,
graphics
processors,
etc. Nonetheless recovering evidence from a
VM is more difficult not only because we are
investigating one process of the host operating
system (OS), but also because of the volatility
of a VM. Evidence in a VM can be lost easily
when it is moved [6] or deleted.
The 'throwaway' nature of VMs also allows
their use as anti-forensics tools, as discussed by
Barrett and Kipper in [6]. They further
propose that in future a truly disposable OS
may be created for single session use, using
hypervisor functions and applications moved to
the Web to create that OS, and dismantled
completely when shut down. This prospect
will defeat any forensics tool not in a position
to capture the OS and data, prior to shut
down - nothing being left to analyse after the
session is finished.
Cloud computing provides users with a
flexibility that traditional computing lacks. It
allows
organisations
to
manage
their
computing needs on an on-demand basis,
rather than a lead-in time of perhaps weeks or
months if installing physical hardware. It
allows a company to balance its workload very
quickly, maintain secure images of their data,
and ensure resilience against hardware failure
[4]. This business model enables costs to be
controlled - you pay for what you use. Cloud
computing models, such as SaaS 1, DaaS, IaaS
all rely on virtualisation to deliver their
services [5]. These components form the basis
of cloud computing, including distributed
1

Software as a service,
Infrastructure as a Service

Page 48

Desktop

as

a

Service,

computing and high speed bandwidth [6]. Our
focus
is
on
virtualisation
in
cloud
computing. Cloud computing, and the ability
to create a computing instance when required,
pose Law Enforcement (LE) with a difficult
investigation model. The multi-tenancy [7]
nature of much of cloud computing and the
sharing of resources, adds to the investigation
more difficulties.
In this paper, we propose a method of
gathering evidence from a VM's vHDD, reduce
the data size being gathered, and minimise
intrusion on a suspect VM. In the case of
remote acquisition of a VM's data, physical
access to the hardware that a VM resides on is
difficult, but will not be necessary in the
context of what we propose. The paper is
organised as follows: Firstly we outline what
technologies are currently available to carry
out a digital forensic examination on a VM. In
section 2 we examine how to best gather data
from a vHDD. We then describe our approach
to VM forensics and how we implement
it. Section 4 looks at how best to optimise
software execution, evidence gathering, and the
consequences of these for both the suspect and
investigator. We support our optimisation
techniques with metrics of execution times
before and after optimisation. Finally, we will
conclude by outlining further research.

2. VIRTUAL MACHINES
VM technologies fall into two categories - Type
I and Type II virtual machines, the distinction
between these lies in the presence of an
underlying OS. Type I virtualisation involves
a hypervisor (VMM) using a thin layer of code
to allocate resources in real-time. They run
directly on the hardware and are commonly
known as 'bare-metal' hypervisors, examples
include XenServer from Citrix, ESXi from
VMware and Hyper-V from Microsoft. They
reduce the overhead needed by the hypervisor
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itself, and provide good
availability and security.

performance,

Type II hypervisors run as an application
on top of an operating system. They are very
popular and are usually used to emulate
another OS within the OS that the hypervisor
is running, e.g. running Windows within Linux,
or vice versa. These are more usually found on
home computer systems and where security
and efficiency is less critical, examples include
Oracle VirtualBox, Microsoft VirtualPC and
VMware.

2.1 VM Forensics - Current State
of Art
VMs were introduced in the 1960's [8] but
declined in demand, due mainly to the decline
in popularity of mainframes and the wider
accessibility of personal computers [27]. Their
recent re-emergence and use by different
entities, has brought with it many challenges
for Law Enforcement [9]. VM digital forensics
is similar to that of traditional digital forensics,
such as log analysis and data capture and
analysis, but recovering those data from a
cloud VM can pose a challenge. Methods and
tools exist to recover data from traditional
computer systems and their hard drives, but
although the principles are essentially the
same, collecting evidence from a vHDD can be
more problematic.
In a traditional digital investigation
capturing the data on a hard drive involves
capturing the suspect computer and seizing
and removing the hard drive for analysis,
however, seizing the hard drive, both physical
and virtual, that a VM uses is less
straightforward. If the VM is operating in the
cloud through a service provider, accessing the
physical hard drive could involve removing it
from the data centre, and then examining
it. This is likely to take time, running the risk
of data being altered, removed, deleted or
destroyed. It may also expose other users’
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data on the hard drive, causing privacy
concerns, furthermore there are also very few
tools to assist in investigating a live vHDD,
apart from LibVMI [15]. If the VM is
operating on a desktop machine, in VirtualBox
or KVM/QEMU, for instance, it may not be
possible to gain access to the virtual drive.

2.2

VM Introspection

The most important VM forensics technology
developed to date has been Virtual Machine
Introspection (VMI) [10]. VMI uses the virtual
machine manager (VMM) to view what is
happening inside a VM. It was originally
introduced as a method of implementing
intrusion detection systems, allowing a VM to
be monitored from outside to assess what is
happening inside, but is now used extensively
in the forensic investigation of VMs.
VMI describes how a VMM administrator
can inspect that is occurring inside a VM, to
view the VM memory, its processes, its
network
settings,
its
installed
OSes,
applications and services. This powerful
feature of VMI has allowed criminal
investigations of VMs to take place and data
to be captured, which would otherwise have
been lost.
Nance et al. [11] describes VMI as falling
into two categories - those that monitor a VM
and those that interfere with a VM. Using
VMI to monitor the runtime state of a VM
effectively allows such monitoring to take place
from outside the guest system being monitored,
without the knowledge of that guest system
[11]. Furthermore, without knowledge of VMI
monitoring it is therefore not possible to
prevent it, nor is it possible to interfere with
that monitoring [11]. Interference, on the
other hand, comprises a different set of
circumstances, for instance when VMI
interferes with a VM it responds to some
condition in the VM that requires a response,
such as a detected threat, by terminating the
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affected process. This interference with the
guest system may alter data, this should be
avoided as any change to the system being
inspected could effectively alter evidence and
thus possibly provide a different outcome to
that of an unaltered system. This will have
consequences for any evidence recovered and
may cause that evidence to be ruled as
inadmissible. VMI does not affect a VM's
performance in any other way, as it does not
use any of the VM's resources.

2.2.1 Semantic Awareness
The semantic gap that exists between raw data
and its natural language representation, is
recognised as the greatest challenge facing
virtual machine forensics [30]. Nance et al.
[11] describe semantic awareness as the VM's
knowledge of its guest operating system (OS),
and by Joshi et al. [28] as the level of
abstraction
used
by
a
virtual
machine. Bridging that gap is not a trivial
process and is made more difficult by the
failure of the OS being inspected to follow
certain semantic expectations, it is very much
dependent upon the OS following the known
data structures and syntax of that OS. By
failing to follow those structures and syntaxes
Bahram et al. [13] described how to subvert
VMI in such a way that any data recovered
through VMI renders those data to be
questionable. This can be achieved through
the simple assumption that data on the suspect
system conforms with the expected data
structures and syntax of that kernel and by
not adhering to that assumption those data
can become subverted. This means that to
evade VMI a completely different view of the
system can be presented to VMI, than that
which is seen by the user. This approach can
cause reversal of that obfuscation to be
computationally very complex and very
expensive, and without prior knowledge of how
that is achieved, it would make tools such as
The Volatility Framework of little use in
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analysing
those
subverted
memory
files. Compromisation can be achieved by
various means, including using a rootkit,
possibly causing in any data being recovered
from that OS being rendered unsound, with
significant implications for the value of
evidence gathered from those data.

2.2.2 The Volatility Framework
The Volatility Framework [14] is used in
forensic memory analysis. It provides an
analysis platform for a wide range of file types,
including core dumps, from various OSes,
including Linux kernels from 2.6.11 to 4.2.3,
OS X from 10.5.x to 10.11.x and most
Windows OS's from Windows XP SP2 to
Windows 10, and various virtual machine
monitors (VMMs), including VMware and
VirtualBox. Linux core dumps can be dumped
into ELF files which can be parsed using
Volatility. However, accessing the vHDD is
not possible using Volatility, as it is a memory
inspection tool.
Another very useful memory acquisition
and inspection tool is LibVMI [15]. This is a
tool that allows reading from and writing to a
VM's memory. It was developed for the Xen
VMM, but has been extended to other
VMMs. As Volatility was originally intended
for use on static memory images the developers
of LibVMI extended its functionality to live
memory address spaces by writing a Python
wrapper for Volatility for use by LibVMI
[15]. Although this is a powerful addition to
the digital forensic examiners toolkit it is very
likely to suffer a latency issue between when
data are present in RAM and the when
LibVMI captures them. This could cause data
to be swapped out of memory, or be
overwritten before LibVMI captures those
data.
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2.2.3 Best Practice Guidelines
The Association of Chief Police Officers of the
UK (ACPO) [16], ISO Standard 27037 [17], U.
S. Department of Justice Office of Justice
Programmes National Institute of Justice [18]
and the EU publication Guidelines on Digital
Forensic Procedures for OLAF Staff [19] have
set guidelines to be followed when examining
digital evidence.
The ACPO have published four simple
principles to be followed, Principles 1 and 2 are
most relevant to our work. Briefly described,
these are: Principle 1 expressly disallows
changes to original data, Principle 2 describes
how data should only be accessed by a
qualified person, but allows an examiner to
explain the reasons for any action taken that
may have changed the original data, this is
important in the context of VM forensics and
our approach to this. These principals have
been accepted as best practice by the Courts in
the UK, Ireland and Canada, and have
influenced the drafting of the EU OLAF
guidelines.

3.

COLLECTING DATA
FROM A VHDD

There are many tools and collection of tools
available to examine data on a physical hard
drive, e.g. EnCase [20], the SANS Investigative
Forensics Toolkit [21], FTK [22], TSK [23],
these
have
varying
degrees
of
functionality. What they all have in common
is that they require that the hard disk be
available to be examined, or an image of that
hard disk, something not necessarily possible
where a cloud VM is concerned. It is possible
to obtain an image of a vHDD when a VM is
captured while still live, but the volatility of
VMs can still make this a difficult
process. Typically, VM data are captured
through a snapshot of the VM via the VMM.
It preserves the VM at a specific time, but is
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limited in that it is a fixed image and will fail
to capture data subsequent to the snapshot.
Also the VM must be live when taking a
snapshot rather than the scenario in digital
forensics of a standard computer where off-line
capture is possible.
The ACPO Good Practice Guide for
Digital Evidence and the US Department of
Justice Special Report of April 2004[18] are
two very relevant reports and were written to
contribute to a framework for ensuring
gathered evidence and the methods used to
recover that evidence, meet a minimum
standard. They were originally intended to
guide examination of standard computer
systems, but these guidelines equally apply to
VMs.
When data are recovered from a VM they
can be processed in the same manner as those
recovered from standard systems. In our
proposal, we calculate and recover the md5
signatures of data and propose using these
signatures to match against data sets of hash
signatures of known files.
Matching the
recovered hashes against those in repositories
such as the National Software Reference
Library (NSRL) can identify the files in
question where those hash signatures exist in
the library. This method of file identification
is efficient, because files are identified by
means of using a hash signature. In our
proposal, we generate MD5’s of found files, by
doing this we reduce data to be recovered from
several MB to 32B. This has advantages in
reducing the bandwidth necessary to transmit
data, and reducing the volume of data to be
stored prior to transmission or recovery. By
identifying suspect data through their MD5
hash we can flag those files we need to recover
and
alert
an
investigator
to
their
presence. Any alteration to the original data,
prior to generating an MD5 hash, will result in
a different hash signature to that which would
have been generated with original data. This
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could be addressed through sub-file forensics,
but this is not examined this in this research.

4.
EVIDENCE SEARCH
THROUGH INJECTED CODE
Our approach to VM forensics involves
injecting executable forensic software into a
VM and executing that software. In their
paper, Tobin and Kechadi [24] described how
code injected into a VM could be used to
execute known benevolent code to carry out
digital forensics in that VM, they elaborated
on some benefits of doing this. In this paper
part of this proposal is implemented and the
results are described.
We have built a simple search engine for
this purpose, which will have minimal impact
on the host system in terms of processor time
consumed, and other resources necessary, e.g.
RAM and bandwidth. This engine will simply
search a virtual drive, or partition, for predefined file types, for example jpegs or
documents, and create an MD5 hash of each
file found that satisfies the search criteria.
The hash signature is then saved to a separate
file for extraction by VMI software. This
approach allows very fast searching of a hard
drive, reduces the volume of data for
extraction and minimises interaction with the
host system.
Evidence integrity can be compromised by
writing to a hard drive. Preventing this
happening in a digital forensics laboratory
invariably means interfacing a write-blocker
between the hard drive and the forensics
tool. Using a write-blocker is not possible in
the VM forensics approach we propose. To
solve this problem we have written a software
write-blocker for use with this search
engine. We create a small RAM disk, we then
install the tool into that RAM disk, execute it
from there and save all data found to files
within the RAM disk. This prevents any data
being written to the vHDD, preserving the
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vHDD, and because the RAM disk is a
reserved area of RAM there are no changes to
RAM data. The small size of the RAM disk
used, 8 MiB, has very little impact on the VM
and its performance.
We believe our approach has some
important advantages. First it significantly
scales down the volume of data needed to be
extracted, second it provides an investigator
with a forensically sound fingerprint of a file
used, or distributed. Code can be tailored to
suit any purpose required, it can be customised
to search for and recover files, and export them
or save them for extraction by VMI software,
and by using the OS semantics this can help
bridge the semantic gap. It can help escape
kernel data structure manipulation as outlined
by Bahram et al [13] by identifying the means
of such manipulation, and speed of execution
may avoid loss of VM data through shutdown
or power-off.
Using the hash signature to help identify
files reduces the volume of data for recovery to
32 B per file, from a jpeg of approximately 5
MB, a reduction in data size of approx. 1.5 x
4
10 , giving a very significant reduction in data
volume to be extracted. This will result in
extraction of a much smaller data footprint,
reduce the bandwidth necessary and minimise
the risk of corruption.
Providing an md5 signature of a file allows
that file to be matched against databases of
hash signatures of known files. The NIST
National Software Reference Library (NSRL),
among others, currently provide a Reference
Data Set against which md5 signatures can be
referenced and their corresponding files
identified. This is a very fast and secure
method of identifying files. Furthermore, the
hash signatures can be used to identify files
recovered from other computers and suspected
to have originated from the system being
inspected.
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Overcoming the semantic gap is not a
trivial
matter,
it
is
expensive
and
computationally complex. Using software
injected into an OS, in the manner we
describe, and executing that software natively
on the suspect machine, we are using the
original data in the file system, the semantics
of the target OS and the data structures of
that OS. By accessing the file data present on
the system, we can recover those files of
interest, we should not need to convert data
from its raw state to its natural language
representation, nor should we have a need to
address the data structures. This is a very
significant advantage to our approach, as it
helps reduce the time needed to examine a
system, saves investigator time and reduces the
volume of data to be recovered.
We
also
overcome
the
subversion
techniques described by Bahram et al [13]. In
the same way as we describe overcoming the
semantic gap, we also use the kernel data
structures of a compromised operating system
to our advantage, by processing data inside
that compromised system. We must be very
cautious that by using a compromised OS we
run a significant risk of compromising data
recovered, but it is possible to determine the
method of manipulation used and by doing so
it should be possible to reverse it and recover
uncompromised data.
Speed of execution is important whether
inspecting a standard computer system or a
VM. A standard computer will have a hard
drive which can be removed and data
recovered from it, but a VM will have no such
physical drive, it does not have a persistent
physical data store. This is compounded by
the volatility of VMs and their storage, delete
the VM and everything within the VM is lost.
By alerting a user to external activity on their
VM this can quickly result in the destruction
of the VM and loss of all data. It is therefore
important to use code that executes quickly.
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5.

EXPERIMENT

We describe here what experiments we carried
out, and which test data we used.

5.1

Code Optimisation

Optimising code execution is best achieved
through careful design of the algorithms,
making use of the available hardware, reducing
interaction with the user and selective
targeting of data for processing. We have used
CPU affinity to make the best use of the
available CPUs, and CPU cache, by pinning
our tools to one CPU and timing execution.

5.2

Test Environment

To build our software engine and the
investigation
environment
we
used
KVM/QEMU v1.3.2 running on Sabayon
Linux v15.11, kernel 4.2.0 and created a VM
using the same Sabayon Linux version as the
host system. We used an Intel i7 processor, at
1.7 GHz, with 4 GB RAM, and an SSD at 540
MB/sec read speed. We used a relatively low
power processor to mirror as closely as possible
the performance of an Amazon Web Services
T2 medium EC2 instance, to measure how our
software might operate on such an
instance. We gave our VM 1,024 MB of RAM,
20 GB of SSD and 2 vCPUs. We copied a
data set of 2.5 GB - 12,808 files, in 4642
directories - into the guest and used this as our
test data. Allocating two vCPUs allowed us to
manipulate our test platform to our own
specifications. The purpose of this was to
make comparison between two different
management scenarios, one where the OS
managed the vCPU allocation and one where
we pinned our program to one vCPU. We
executed our program in these two
management environments to find which one
returned the best performance and gave the
best results in terms of execution speed.

5.3

Description
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To achieve our aims, we built a tool to search
the content of a hard drive. The tool searches
a file tree for files, recursing into subdirectories when they are found. It then uses
the Linux utility file to extract the file type,
from any files found. We then used the grep
command to search the output of the file
command to identify text files. The program
then built the full path to the files found and
used the Linux command md5sum to calculate
the MD5 hash of the files found. The
'md5sum' output is then saved to file.
We developed this tool on the host system
described above and compiled it using the
Gentoo Hardened 4.9.3 p1.1 version of
gcc. We took this route building our own
search engine in preference to using the Linux
terminal utility 'find'. The find command can
be tailored to a user’s specification by
customising the path to be searched and the
files to be searched for, however initial testing
showed that this approach consumed was CPU
heavy, resulting in longer execution times than
our own search engine when we compared
those times.
The POSIX interface library contains a
header file, 'ftw.h', used to recursively search a
file system tree. We wrote a program using
this header file, to be used as a comparison
environment. We used this program to make
comparisons between its execution time and
our program execution time. We have
designed our tool to replicate the functions of
both find and ftw.h exactly. Our tool
recursively calls directories in a file system
tree, searches those directories for files
appropriate to the search criteria and processes
those files as required. It continues until a
termination character is found at which point
it will exit the search of that directory branch
to resume its search of the parent directory.

5.4 Tool Execution
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In our example we sought text files, identifying
them using the Linux terminal command file,
and generated an md5 hash for each file
found. We closed all open processes prior to
the test runs. We ran both programs, our
search program, Tool_1, and one using ftw.h –
Tool_2 – ten times and took the mean
execution time. Initial execution times were
consistently within a range that indicated that
further testing of both programs would not
significantly influence those results. Our VM
was provisioned with two vCPUs and we
carried out two separate sets of tests. In the
first test run we pinned our programs to one
vCPU in the VM and timed ten runs of both
tools, in the second test run we allowed the
VM operating system manage CPU balancing
while executing our programs. We saved the
output from both sets of tests to files. Both
tools generated an MD5 hash of files found and
saved the resulting hash and the complete file
path, to file.
Pinning a process to one CPU, vCPU or
core forces the execution of that process to be
carried out exclusively on that CPU or core,
affinity can result in greater efficiency
[25]. Efficiency can arise by optimising cache
performance and reducing cache miss rates
[29], task data does not need to be cycled,
leading to efficiency, and therefore time
saving. Table 1 illustrates the results we
obtained from our tool runs, we have labelled
the data appropriately - pinned meaning
pinned to one vCPU, unpinned meaning OS
managed balancing.
Test Results.
Table 1
Timing of program runs of the two tools used - showing
ranges +/- mean.

pinned

unpinned

Tool_1 47.48s ± 0.5s

55.59s ± 1.6s

Tool_2 101s ± 2.1s

91s ± 2.5s to10s
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Our test results show that our tool ran
significantly faster than that using ftw.h and
was faster again when CPU affinity was
applied.
This
'unbalanced'
processing
environment had an appreciably positive
outcome for execution times. An unexpected
outcome of our experiments showed that there
was smaller divergence from the mean
execution time when our tool was measured,
compared with a wider divergence range when
Tool_2 was tested.
We ran further tests to verify that the
correct MD5 hashes were being returned by
our tool by taking random entries from the
results files and separately calculating MD5
hashes of these files. Those results confirmed
that our tool was executing as expected.
Comparison of the results showed that our tool
runs faster than the alternative tool. In the
context of our tests and the volume of data
used the time differences do not appear to be
of significance, but scaling to much larger file
systems we would expect the disparity to
become more obvious.

6.

PERFORMANCE
AND ANALYSIS

Linux maintains a page cache to accelerate
access to files. Data can very quickly be read
from cache rather than re-reading the data
from storage, this facility is also known as disk
buffering [26]. This valuable feature can
significantly increase the performance of
processes by reading data once from disk,
caching it to fast cache memory and reading it
from the cache for subsequent operations
involving those data, rather than accessing the
very much slower memory.
In our experiments, cached data produced
very slightly anomalous results each time we
timed our program operation. This occurred
because we were re-using the data from the
first program run on subsequent runs, thus
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accelerating data access. We corrected this
feature by clearing the cache each time we ran
each process.
Time is of critical importance in VM
forensics and any method that can reduce the
time taken to recover evidence from a VM
should be availed of. Our tool indicates that a
tailored solution to this problem can have
significant benefits in terms of run time
reduction.

7.

CONCLUSION

VM forensics is in its infancy, with the growth
in VM use, and its expected future growth, the
need to forensically examine VMs will only
escalate. We were careful to ensure that the
tool we developed impacted the system being
examined in a very insignificant way by
writing just one file to RAM disk. We have
shown that our tool has a number of important
qualities, it executes quickly. It is simple and
forensically sound.
Our approach allows us to tailor our tool
to probe any system, whether it is a VM or
traditional computer system, any hardware
platform or any software platform. It will not
be dependent on any compiler, we inject an
executable program. We can customise our
tool to recover any evidence, any data,
including the password files, log files, Process
Identifier (PID) lists, etc. We are currently
working on ways to recover open and running
processes and ways of cloaking our
investigative tool execution from a user,
presenting a view of the system where it
appears only user processes are running.
Our software has a small footprint, it is
compact and efficient. One feature of our tool
is its flexibility and we are investigating
extending it to interact with OS's other than
Linux. As future work, we will build on the
strength of the work we present in this
paper. We will also be investigating how best
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to remove or export the results file from the
VM in a forensically secure manner. This is a
simple, secure, fast way of recovering data with
a reduced risk of corruption of those data. We
will also look at the feasibility of extending our
approach in memory forensics [31] of mobile
devices in smart phone investigations [32].
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